Congressional trouble for Marine armor and the possible outcome.

Another view of the SUPERAV via Defensenews.com
THINK DEFENCE (you should check out his website if you have an interest in European defense issues in general and UK matters in particular...none better) sent me this pdf and its raises serious issues for Marine Corps vehicle procurement----and the people asking the questions are none other than the Congressional Research Office.


First this...
Legislative provisions in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act suggest despite Marine Corps testimony to the congressional defense committees in early 2012, Congress continues to  have questions regarding the ACV/MPC fleet mix. In the previously discussed RFIs for both  vehicles, the ACV must be able to self-deploy from amphibious shipping and deliver a reinforced Marine infantry squad (17 Marines) from a launch distance at or beyond 12 miles, while the MPC must have a “robust tactical swim capability (shore-to-shore) and be capable of operating at 6 knots in a fully developed sea.” Some analysts note the similarity in requirements and question whether, in an era of fiscal constraint, two different vehicles are needed.
Then...
 The ACV is scheduled to achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC)24 between FY2020 and FY2022, depending on the outcome of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)25 and final acquisition plans. The MPC is scheduled to achieve IOC in FY2022
These and a few other simple questions being asked by the eggheads in the CRO should concern anyone that has an interest in Marine Corps armored vehicles.

My issues are as follows...
1.  The MPC is up and running.  The requirements are set, testing will begin next summer and at least Lockheed Martin/Patria and BAE/Iveco are ready to go NOW.  The ACV is still vaporware.  Yet for some reason we're staging the introduction of the MPC AFTER the ACV.  From the outside looking in, it appears that we're going to have a winner of the MPC contest waiting and ready to go while we get the ACV sorted out and in production.  Correction, until we get it sorted out and production complete!  That just doesn't seem like a realistic plan.  Not for the Marine Corps or the manufacturer that wins.

2.  The requirements are so similar and I feel confident (at least right now) that both the HAVOC and the SUPERAV will crush it.  They'll perform up to standards and probably beyond.  How are we going to get the ACV into production (assuming this jacked production scheme actually passing Congressional muster) when the powers that be are going to be looking at vehicles that are "almost" as good as the ACV is suppose to be at lower cost?

Read the entire report for yourself though.  As it currently stands confidence is NOT high when it comes to believing that the Marine Corps will successfully navigate the current plan.

Unless leadership gets a handle on our amphibious vehicle issues and quick I'm afraid that we're going to see another EFV debacle.  Only this time not because of cost but because of a failed plan implemented poorly.

Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for ...