Check out this tidbit from SOFREP.
The Army, Big Army is shifting gears in anticipation of the next series of conflicts and is preparing itself to be more strategically and operationally agile. However, in the same way it is difficult to change course once an aircraft as begun its turn so it is with regular Army. The concern then is, will the regular Army’s move towards less conventional methods begin to envelope or overrun that of Army SOF. Will this creep of policy and doctrine create one large special force that will no longer be able to address the more asymmetric threats of the future? Additionally will this shift cause conventional Army units to lose sight of their best practices, best practices based on decades of experience? Are we, the United States leaving ourselves open to being ill prepared to handle a conventional adversary should one arise?Read the whole thing but my takeaway is as follows...
To answer many of these questions we must take a step back and look back at look at why SOF was developed. For this reason I leave you with what I believe to be one of the most authoritative definitions of Special Operations by Dr. Robert Spulak from his standout paper “A Theory of Special Operations” (2007).
“Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, specially organized units manned by carefully selected people using modified equipment and trained in unconventional applications of tactics and against strategic and operational objectives. Further, the successful conduct of special operations relies on individual and small unit proficiency in specialized skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation against adversaries often unprepared to react. It has often been stated that the unique capabilities of SOF complement those of conventional forces.”
*SOCOM is finally realizing that just as they've poached on conventional mission sets in the past (think US Army Rangers taking the airfield seizure mission from the 82nd), you're now going to see conventional forces poaching on SOCOM territory.
*SOCOM's huge logistics footprint is actually about to start biting. They (SOCOM) often point to how a few trigger pullers are able to influence events. What's left unsaid is the large number of people required to support each shooter. I don't have the numbers but eyeballing it, it looks like its substantially more than a conventional Soldier or Marine.
*Raids don't make you elite. Rangers are the premier raid force or so they would tell you. They just might be. I don't know and really don't care. What I do know is that they're some outstanding light infantry. But the issue isn't the Rangers. The issue is raids. Every force in SOCOM has been concentrating on it with the possible exception of the Special Forces. Every single entity. The problem. Everyone does it. Every Battalion in the Marine Corps does raids. Every Army Brigade. Insertion method be damned, being a raider is no longer a special skill set.
*Insertion methods aren't so special. Every Marine in a Infantry Battalion can fast rope, do basic small boat handling and can storm out the back of an AAV. With the exception of the AAV ride, you're looking at the hall marks of SOCOM. Everyone in SOCOM fast ropes, handles small boats and jumps. The issue with that is a beefed up 82nd could do the same (and lets be honest really does the same now with the exception of small boat drills). SO I said all that to emphasize the fact that unless you're talking HALO, HAHO, LALO or scuba insertion techniques then its not really special.
Long story short the line between Special Operations and Conventional Forces is closing. How do you solve it? By reversing what has been done.
If SOCOM is to remain SOCOM then its essential to shrink the force and realize that not every mission requires SOCOM. A 70,000 man force is not elite. Its time to shrink the beast in order to save it.